Irreconcilable Differences:
Democracy and Islamism in the Muslim World
Since the fall of the Ottoman empire in the early 20th century, Islamists have sought to find a place in Muslim governance. Later, emerging from the dust and rubble of WWII, many nations of the world were faced with an ideological choice, democracy and freedom or communism and authoritarianism. Stuck in the middle were the Islamists. An ideology that principally is anti- in its world view and alignment, Cagaptay (2016) stresses an important distinction between Islamism (or Islamist) and Islam as a religious faith, with Islamism being a more political position that uses the Islamic faith as a source of legitimacy and gain adherents to its cause. Islamists can be seen as anti-communist as communism is ultimately based on materialism as a philosophy and not congruent with the teachings of Islam. Likewise, Islamism is also anti-Western, anti-Christian, and anti-capitalist (Cagaptay) which would logically lead to anti-democracy. Though Islamists have in their mission sought to bring change and reform to existing authoritarian ruling regimes in the MENA region, most notably and recently through the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings through democratic elections that were held in the region after the ouster of some of these regimes, the question remains about the viability and legitimacy of a relationship between Islamism and democracy in the Muslim world. Are Islamists truly embracing democracy as a philosophy or are they using it merely as a procedural vehicle to show a veneer of legitimacy to ride to power and then have other motives once in power?
Two examples from Muslim majority nations may provide some clues. While both examples have not come to fully realize a declared Islamic state achieved through procedural democratic means, elements of Islamism have manifested themselves once these Islamist parties stepped into the ruling role in their respective countries. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) started out in the early 20th century as an activist movement that gained popularity and a considerable following for its social services efforts where previous ruling Egyptian regimes had failed. The MB found a valuable resource in one of the most basic elements of a given society which Singerman (2006) describes as the family unit. It is from this basic societal building block that the MB found a foundational support and financial base. This relationship gave the MB an identity as “defenders of public virtue and family values” as it relates to Islam (Singerman p. 10). Within the concept of family values however, exists the familiar ethos (Singerman) that holds the essence of the values of the family to a broader realm in the form of society, governance, and national identity. The ethos includes the ability to debate, scrutinize and criticize, especially when it comes to one’s government. Such elements are also elements found in democratic societies.
Being relegated to the political sidelines because of its near constant repression by authoritarian regimes, the MB was a relatively minor player in Egyptian politics up until the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. However, their wide popularity and ability allowed them to mobilize faster than other movements in the Egyptian social landscape and found an opportunity to find a path to power after the ouster of the Mubarak regime. Their Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) claimed a platform where sharia law would not be implemented but rather sought to uphold Islamic values in society and family life. Upon their presidential electoral victory, however, the façade of the Brotherhood’s FJP platform began to chip away revealing other designs, most notably the attempt to place a religious advisor to the president for matters that require an Islamist perspective, thereby linking religion with state activities. Indeed, in the one year that Morsi and the MB assumed power in Egypt, a rush to consolidate power for the MB was apparent in a newly written constitution and neutralizing powers of other legislative functions that would have been a threat to the presidency and the MB to consolidate their hold over the country (Kahn, 2014). Such moves were not lost on the people who felt cheated and misled. Parts of Egyptian society felt excluded and marginalized, even those who were not Muslim, and were supporters of the MB’s civic and social successes with society prior to the ascension of power (Kahn). This, with the lack of experience in governance, and the inability to shed conservative (Islamic) values led to an ouster for Morsi and the MB. Staunch supporters of Morsi, the FJP, and the Brotherhood decried that the military coup in 2013 was a transgression of democracy and that Morsi should remain in power until the end of his term when new elections were called for. The real transgression was that the Brotherhood and the FJP only embraced the procedural means of democracy (i.e., elections) and eschewed substantive and normative democracy to merely have the veneer of legitimate power through elections to pursue their own anti-democratic agendas. Now the MB is in an existential struggle for their very existence, on the fringes of the political scene and has lost legitimacy.
In Türkiye, the Islamist question had a different look. The current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), led by its founder and current president of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made its rise in 2001 in the midst of a secular society originally built by Türkiye’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who envisioned a Turkish civil society free of old Islamist thought that was seen as holding back the potential of Turkish society, its economy, and global standing by limiting Islamic influence in governance. Appealing to the Muslim population who felt strongly about their religiosity and identity, the AKP found a large support base while at the same time deftly played the entire political landscape to their favor by supporting a secular-based economy and avoiding many contentious issues that concern Islam, relegating it to lesser importance that could be better handled from a bottom-up approach where if the people wanted it and were supporters of the AKP, then the AKP would adopt it too. Over time this “creeping Islamization” that Somer (2016) describes became noticed as a characteristic of the AKP and labeled as “Islamist and authoritarian” (Somer) by preventing basic western democratic elements as a free press, the right to demonstrate grievances against the government, restricting basic individual freedoms and marginalizing some segments of society making it less pluralistic. The party has also been accused of cementing its hold on governance, prohibiting some parties to function, and packing important governmental institutions with AKP party members. The AKP seems to be firmly entrenched in Turkish politics, despite its authoritarian and anti-democratic tones.
In both examples above, Erdoğan’s AKP and the Brotherhood’s FJP rule had more of a desire to abandon democratic philosophies once in power and merely sought to use elections more as a vehicle to obtain “legitimate” control of the government and then seek to conquer the state once in power, implementing their “hidden” agendas. Political commentators have wrongly assessed both the AKP and FJP ability in their respective nation’s politics to what Somer (2016) describes as being “tolerant and flexible” where they have proven (wrongfully) that Islamism and democracy can work as shown through popular elections. What these critics and commentators have missed however is that both political parties have not fully embraced democratic principles as described above. Once in power, both the AKP and FJP have changed course and appeared to consolidate their own power structures rather than keep the flame of democracy alive. Having an Islamist platform for the party’s cause is prohibiting both the AKP and Brotherhood’s FJP party from making any real progress toward a democratic society in Turkey and Egypt, respectively; it even does not bode well for Muslims who support both parties as it eventually will prevent those freedoms and benefits that they sought under authoritarian regimes from ever becoming realized under the AKP and FJP parties.
Thus, the question arises, are Islamism and democracy compatible and viable for long term success? Some, like Sayyid Qtub, a central leader in the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s expressly noted the incompatibility of the coupling. Qtub argued that democracy gave the individual the freedom to fulfill desires that Islam otherwise sought to repress. In addition, democracy permitted people to create laws for governance of societies which contradicts the belief for Islamists that Islam prescribes laws in the form of sharia which came from Allah. Thus, as Kahn (2014) notes, man-made laws would potentially be in direct conflict with sharia as such laws would provide the ability of women to participate in government, permit homosexual unions, and give minorities (non-Muslims) the same rights as the Muslim faithful (plurality), all of which contradict with Islamic thought.
Others like Somer (2016) and Roy (2012) feel that the potential for Islam and democracy to be viable exists but still has some hurdles to overcome. Somer identifies the “democratizing potential that the Islamist-based AKP has in Turkey but at the same time has identified the critical need to focus away from power consolidation that seemingly takes away democratic freedoms and rights of the people and focus more on making government more accountable and open to criticism. This would require a “distancing” of Islamist influence in governance while still maintaining a cultural identity of Islam for its support base. In Roy’s view, despite the dramatic turn of events witnessed through the MB’s fall from Egyptian rule that lasted only one year, he believes that this is only the start of a flourishing of a marriage between democracy and Islamism. He cautions that there will be failures along the way, but these failures will be learning experiences for future opportunities. The issue that remains, however, is that how many will suffer from these failures and for how long?
The optimism suggests that there may be a middle ground from which democracy and Islamism can thrive as a singular ideal for governance in the Muslim world. Both Kahn (2014) and Roy (2012) note that no one Islamist group has a monopoly over Islam in the Muslim sphere and there are variations of Islam that can be adaptable to democracy. One such example is what Nasr (2005) notes as “Muslim democracy” which is what he notes is a non-fundamentalist, pragmatic way in looking at politics in the Muslim world. The goal for these Muslim democrats is to find a position in the center of the political spectrum that appeals to both people seeking a democratic government while at the same time promoting Islamic values but without the requirement that such an Islamic state needs what Nasr (2005) notes as full sharia in its laws and governance. The right position on the spectrum will ultimately decide if such a party can succeed. But one of the problems with those who practice Muslim democracy is the lack of any real, firm, platform to remain mobile and popular to a wide voter base. Their pragmatism thus seems to reflect the situation in the moment that affects voters at the time and nothing long-term. Angering one part of the voter base may end up alienating a significant number of people and choosing not to vote for them in the upcoming elections is a real threat to Muslim democrats. In seeking to find an example of Muslim democracy in the Muslim world, Nasr (2005) points to Turkey’s AKP party as the best example. Nasr finds optimism in the future of Muslim democracy if it can simply find leaders who can balance Muslim values and ethics within the whole construct of democracy.
In addition, Muslim democracy must embrace not only the procedural tenets of democracy but also the long-term substantive and normative concepts as well. To embrace the concept of democratic elections for legitimacy of power for Islamists and then abandon it for Islamists’ hidden agendas is to sully the political ideology of democracy. Democracy will also place parameters on the activities and purpose of Islamist political parties. It will force them to play by the rules or as what Roy (2012) claims, will place them at the fringes of the politics and not in the preferred center. But playing by these rules will force them to either change their philosophy of “anti-everything”, especially anti-democracy, or at the very least compromise on matters of Islamic thought.
In the end it will boil down to see whether Islamists will abandon democracy and lose governing legitimacy, an electorate pool that seeks more freedoms, and a more pluralistic future, or if it will abandon the central philosophy of Islam, an identity that it has held on for centuries and has defined a culture and a mode of life. With it comes the abandonment of sharia; Allah’s law for man’s law, and to turn one’s back on the Prophet Muhammad and Allah. For Islamists whatever path they choose will lead to an irrevocable loss. Kahn (2014) notes that “the Muslim world is not ready for democracy” (p. 75); he appears to be right. Embracing democracy seems to compromise Islamic values and thought and will leave Islamists without an identity. Eschewing it will allow them to keep their identity but will place them on the fringes of Muslim politics. Either choice can precipitate irreversible damage for itself in Muslim politics.
*This post was originally a submission (9/18/22) in the author's Politics of Islamism course taken at the University of Arizona in the Fall 2022 semester facilitated by Dr. Tolga Turker.
References
al-Anani, K. (2015, Autumn). Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Middle East Journal 69(4), 527-543.
Cagaptay, S. (2016, July 8). Muslims vs. Islamists. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muslims-vs-islamists
Kahn, M. (2014, Spring). Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt. Middle East Policy 23(1), 75-86.
Nasr, S. (2005, April). The Rise of “Muslim Democracy” Journal of Democracy 16(2), 13-27.
Roy, O. (2012, July). The Transformation of the Arab World. Journal of Democracy 23(3), 5-18.
Singerman, D. (2006, Winter). Restoring the Family to Civil Society: Lessons from Egypt. Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 2(1), 1-32.
Somer, M. (2017). Conquering versus democratizing the state: political Islamists and fourth wavedemocratization in Turkey and Tunisia. Democratization 24(6), 1025-1043.