In the name
of Islam
In the Muslim world there have been several approaches to state formation where Islam has played a role in some way either pointedly or on the periphery. As an element of identity, religion is frequently applied to discern one culture from another. For two countries whose population overwhelmingly identifies its self as Muslim – Türkiye and Egypt, each at one time a part of the long history of the Ottoman Empire, the unique routes each country has taken in seeking to place Islam into the state’s formation and identity of its people have started out on one path and has found unintended consequences that has drastically changed the course of each nation, as well as the lives of the populations concerned, and certainly not all in a linear or parallel trajectory with the other.
Despite sharing one common faith, Islam, for hundreds of years in the regions where these modern-day countries are geographically located, Türkiye and Egypt are culturally different in a number of areas. Most Egyptians today are ethnically Egyptian but also largely identify as Arab whereas in Türkiye the majority ethnicity is Turkish. All three countries have other ethnicities contained within their borders and also to some degree permit faiths other than Islam to be practiced but both ethnicities noted above form the basis of their respective countries. In addition to differences in ethnicity amongst these Muslim majority states, each country has experienced Western influence (some would argue correctly, interference) in various degrees as noted by Kramer (1993).
Islam as an element to the identity of Muslim-majority nations in the MENA region and the Levant had its early origins in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire up to its eventual demise after WWI. Before a push to identity with Islamism, Arabism was the identity in vogue for these Muslim-majority and former Ottoman regions. In fact, as Kramer (1993) noted, it was the weakening and overall discontent with the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century and eventual fall in the early 20th century that began the dawn of the Arab Awakening, an attempt to form a pan-Arab state or nation where the former Ottoman Empire once reigned over. After the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France carved up much of the empire and established administrative mandates, drawing out borders that had no real relevance other than British or French interests and providing names for these mandates that had no basis in the history of the local populations (Kramer, 1993). Thus, people within the borders of Syria were identified as Syrians; Palestine, Palestinians; Iraq, Iraqi, and so on. Despite a number of people in these areas identifying as Arab, there were other ethnic populations that did not identify as such. In fact, as Kramer (1993) notes, people began to identify with the Western-named mandated region whose borders they resided in. The dream of a pan-Arab state over time lost its luster; the rulers of these states, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt began to depend on those imperial powers who administered their interests within these states and despite promises of full independence for these states, it wasn’t until the end of WWII that Britain and France finally removed themselves from interests in the region (except for Britain’s interest in the Suez Canal). It was this dependence on the imperial powers that led a type of revolution and change led by individuals like Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, to begin to identify with a return to a more common bond amongst the people of the Middle East /North Africa region (MENA) and the Arabian Peninsula; that bond being Islam. The salience of Islam on Muslims’ lives from all aspects would allow people in al-Banna’s Egypt be free from western fetters and influence. His vision proved to be correct – to the point that the Brotherhood was often deemed a threat to the ruling elements in Egypt throughout the history of the 20th century. Since its founding the Brotherhood has been supported by Egypt’s ruling elite as a support mechanism to placate the people, to it being outlawed because it threatened change of the political mechanisms of the country. Munson (2001) noted these ups and downs in the fortunes of the Society. Up to the present day, the Brotherhood was instrumental in the Arab Spring uprisings (ironically named) of 2010- 2011 where several nations in the Muslim world experienced regime change or ruling parties only kept power through popular reforms and concessions made to the people. The long-term success was a mixed bag; it proved to be disappointing for the Brotherhood in its origin home of Egypt where despite the prior leadership of Hosni Mubarak ceding control after three decades, power was handed over to the Egyptian military who held elections where Mohamed Morsi was elected and served only briefly before a military coup ousted him. A participant of the coup, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi, who was a military officer at the time, was eventually elected after retiring from the military to assume control over Egypt. But even today, the election of el-Sisi has not bode well for the Brotherhood; their claims of oppression through political suppression, unlawful arrests, and unjustified executions of Brotherhood members by the el-Sisi government has the potential to cause further unrest and discord, the opposite of a desire of democratic ideals the brotherhood seeks despite its popularity and prevalence in Western philosophy and governance.
As Egypt has struggled to where to find a place for Islam in its political structures, Türkiye from its birth took a decidedly different path by its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire and a 4-year civil war, Atatürk rose to prominence and looked toward the west and its future and not to its Ottoman and Islamic past. A pragmatic individual who found the need for modernization and western concepts to bring his people out of a backward and impoverished state, Atatürk sought to apply what Keyman (2007) notes as objective secularization on the nation where the dependence of Islam as the rule of life and law was replaced by modern, secular concepts. The hope for Atatürk in this application was that as Turkish citizens seen that secularization of the society would improve the everyday lives of the people, the people would gradually let loose of the idea that Islam was the “path” and as a result jettisoned the idea of a state ruled by Islamic law and concepts that was outmoded and kept people from keeping up with the West. Atatürk’s attempt at objective secularization turned into over time subjective secularization where the government imposed itself on Islam. To be secular is to be more democratic than authoritarian where the government imposes its will on the private lives of individuals and what seemingly should be a freedom of religious practice. While Türkiye may curtail the use of the wearing of headscarves in public places to try to reflect religious equity, the curtailing of scarves in personal preferences of religious expression is seen as the antithesis of a democratic state. What has occurred now because of such restrictions on religious identity is the opposite of secularization in Türkiye, that is, sacralization, and a resurgence of Islamic identity amongst the Turkish people (Keyman, 2007).
The paths taken to achieve a semblance of democracy for these two Muslim-majority nations has resulted in both equally struggling to find a place for Islam within its governance structure. Too much emphasis of Islam for government’s guiding principles has often found more discord than agreement between the ruling government and its people. It has also found the repulsion of Western values and thought which can impede democracy to take root. Too much secularization that imposes a subjective will on its people to limit and distance themselves from Islam in the name of modernity and Western values will also cause discord where one’s good intentions to improve the lives of the population backfires and causes the opposite of secularization – sectarianism, where the people feel the need to defend their personal lives and their faith. A foundation for democracy can be found in both paths. For Türkiye, it is to find an equal footing in both secularization and religious expression where a proper balance can permit democracy and Westernization to thrive. For Egypt, the rejection of Western secular ideals and thought and full immersion of Islamic law will not permit democratic principles to flourish thereby not allowing equality and ordinary citizens’ lives to prosper, a central aim of the Muslim Brotherhood. Social revolutions like the Arab Spring of 2011 will bring some minor successes but as evidenced throughout Egypt’s tumultuous political history of the 20th century and into the 21st, it has been a cycle of revolution, coups, and oppression with intermittent cycles of success. Accepting, like in Türkiye’s case, an equal dose of religious ideology and Western thought can permit democracy to thrive and benefit all in their personal and national pursuits.
*This post was originally a submission (9/11/22) in the author's Politics of Islamism course taken at the University of Arizona in the Fall 2022 semester facilitated by Dr. Tolga Turker.
References
Keyman, E.F. (2007). Modernity, Secularism and Islam The Case of Turkey. Theory, Culture & Society 24(2), 215-234.
Kramer, M. (1993, Summer) Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity. Daedalus, 171-206.
Munson, Z. (2001, Autumn). Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Sociological Quarterly 42(4), 487-510.
Despite sharing one common faith, Islam, for hundreds of years in the regions where these modern-day countries are geographically located, Türkiye and Egypt are culturally different in a number of areas. Most Egyptians today are ethnically Egyptian but also largely identify as Arab whereas in Türkiye the majority ethnicity is Turkish. All three countries have other ethnicities contained within their borders and also to some degree permit faiths other than Islam to be practiced but both ethnicities noted above form the basis of their respective countries. In addition to differences in ethnicity amongst these Muslim majority states, each country has experienced Western influence (some would argue correctly, interference) in various degrees as noted by Kramer (1993).
Islam as an element to the identity of Muslim-majority nations in the MENA region and the Levant had its early origins in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire up to its eventual demise after WWI. Before a push to identity with Islamism, Arabism was the identity in vogue for these Muslim-majority and former Ottoman regions. In fact, as Kramer (1993) noted, it was the weakening and overall discontent with the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century and eventual fall in the early 20th century that began the dawn of the Arab Awakening, an attempt to form a pan-Arab state or nation where the former Ottoman Empire once reigned over. After the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France carved up much of the empire and established administrative mandates, drawing out borders that had no real relevance other than British or French interests and providing names for these mandates that had no basis in the history of the local populations (Kramer, 1993). Thus, people within the borders of Syria were identified as Syrians; Palestine, Palestinians; Iraq, Iraqi, and so on. Despite a number of people in these areas identifying as Arab, there were other ethnic populations that did not identify as such. In fact, as Kramer (1993) notes, people began to identify with the Western-named mandated region whose borders they resided in. The dream of a pan-Arab state over time lost its luster; the rulers of these states, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt began to depend on those imperial powers who administered their interests within these states and despite promises of full independence for these states, it wasn’t until the end of WWII that Britain and France finally removed themselves from interests in the region (except for Britain’s interest in the Suez Canal). It was this dependence on the imperial powers that led a type of revolution and change led by individuals like Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, to begin to identify with a return to a more common bond amongst the people of the Middle East /North Africa region (MENA) and the Arabian Peninsula; that bond being Islam. The salience of Islam on Muslims’ lives from all aspects would allow people in al-Banna’s Egypt be free from western fetters and influence. His vision proved to be correct – to the point that the Brotherhood was often deemed a threat to the ruling elements in Egypt throughout the history of the 20th century. Since its founding the Brotherhood has been supported by Egypt’s ruling elite as a support mechanism to placate the people, to it being outlawed because it threatened change of the political mechanisms of the country. Munson (2001) noted these ups and downs in the fortunes of the Society. Up to the present day, the Brotherhood was instrumental in the Arab Spring uprisings (ironically named) of 2010- 2011 where several nations in the Muslim world experienced regime change or ruling parties only kept power through popular reforms and concessions made to the people. The long-term success was a mixed bag; it proved to be disappointing for the Brotherhood in its origin home of Egypt where despite the prior leadership of Hosni Mubarak ceding control after three decades, power was handed over to the Egyptian military who held elections where Mohamed Morsi was elected and served only briefly before a military coup ousted him. A participant of the coup, Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi, who was a military officer at the time, was eventually elected after retiring from the military to assume control over Egypt. But even today, the election of el-Sisi has not bode well for the Brotherhood; their claims of oppression through political suppression, unlawful arrests, and unjustified executions of Brotherhood members by the el-Sisi government has the potential to cause further unrest and discord, the opposite of a desire of democratic ideals the brotherhood seeks despite its popularity and prevalence in Western philosophy and governance.
As Egypt has struggled to where to find a place for Islam in its political structures, Türkiye from its birth took a decidedly different path by its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire and a 4-year civil war, Atatürk rose to prominence and looked toward the west and its future and not to its Ottoman and Islamic past. A pragmatic individual who found the need for modernization and western concepts to bring his people out of a backward and impoverished state, Atatürk sought to apply what Keyman (2007) notes as objective secularization on the nation where the dependence of Islam as the rule of life and law was replaced by modern, secular concepts. The hope for Atatürk in this application was that as Turkish citizens seen that secularization of the society would improve the everyday lives of the people, the people would gradually let loose of the idea that Islam was the “path” and as a result jettisoned the idea of a state ruled by Islamic law and concepts that was outmoded and kept people from keeping up with the West. Atatürk’s attempt at objective secularization turned into over time subjective secularization where the government imposed itself on Islam. To be secular is to be more democratic than authoritarian where the government imposes its will on the private lives of individuals and what seemingly should be a freedom of religious practice. While Türkiye may curtail the use of the wearing of headscarves in public places to try to reflect religious equity, the curtailing of scarves in personal preferences of religious expression is seen as the antithesis of a democratic state. What has occurred now because of such restrictions on religious identity is the opposite of secularization in Türkiye, that is, sacralization, and a resurgence of Islamic identity amongst the Turkish people (Keyman, 2007).
The paths taken to achieve a semblance of democracy for these two Muslim-majority nations has resulted in both equally struggling to find a place for Islam within its governance structure. Too much emphasis of Islam for government’s guiding principles has often found more discord than agreement between the ruling government and its people. It has also found the repulsion of Western values and thought which can impede democracy to take root. Too much secularization that imposes a subjective will on its people to limit and distance themselves from Islam in the name of modernity and Western values will also cause discord where one’s good intentions to improve the lives of the population backfires and causes the opposite of secularization – sectarianism, where the people feel the need to defend their personal lives and their faith. A foundation for democracy can be found in both paths. For Türkiye, it is to find an equal footing in both secularization and religious expression where a proper balance can permit democracy and Westernization to thrive. For Egypt, the rejection of Western secular ideals and thought and full immersion of Islamic law will not permit democratic principles to flourish thereby not allowing equality and ordinary citizens’ lives to prosper, a central aim of the Muslim Brotherhood. Social revolutions like the Arab Spring of 2011 will bring some minor successes but as evidenced throughout Egypt’s tumultuous political history of the 20th century and into the 21st, it has been a cycle of revolution, coups, and oppression with intermittent cycles of success. Accepting, like in Türkiye’s case, an equal dose of religious ideology and Western thought can permit democracy to thrive and benefit all in their personal and national pursuits.
*This post was originally a submission (9/11/22) in the author's Politics of Islamism course taken at the University of Arizona in the Fall 2022 semester facilitated by Dr. Tolga Turker.
References
Keyman, E.F. (2007). Modernity, Secularism and Islam The Case of Turkey. Theory, Culture & Society 24(2), 215-234.
Kramer, M. (1993, Summer) Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity. Daedalus, 171-206.
Munson, Z. (2001, Autumn). Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Sociological Quarterly 42(4), 487-510.