Situated right below latitude 66̊ North of the Arctic Circle, the island country that is Iceland stands as a bastion of rock, ice, and volcanoes that rises out of the North Atlantic Ocean and, geologically, is the visible division of the North American and Eurasian tectonic plates. For a sparsely populated country of just over 380,000 that sits a considerable distance from any continental landmass, its position on the globe provides a location that is invaluable to the force projection of not only NATO’s mission in Europe but also U.S. foreign policy and its commitments to its European allies, not least to Iceland itself. Yet, the U.S. is leaving the portcullis to the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) Gap wide open to permit the possibility of Russia’s Northern Naval Fleet entry into the lower Atlantic basin as well as ignoring growing activity in an increasingly important Arctic region. The gap is a 700-mile-wide imaginary line that includes the geographic “fenceposts” of Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Historically its importance was critical in the Cold War to deter much of the Soviet Union’s naval capabilities from operating in the North Atlantic and along both the eastern seaboards of United States and Canada and Western Europe.
The strategic salience of the gap first appeared in the mid-20th century on the eve of WWII when both Germany and the United Kingdom seen the value of the island as a way of maintaining supremacy in the North Atlantic. For Iceland and its people, however, war and conflict were something they hoped to shut out while the European continent was busy fighting amongst themselves. While Iceland was still a protectorate under Denmark, the Danish-Icelandic Act (The Union Act) of 1918 gave Iceland sovereign status. The act [1] allowed the Danes to handle the foreign affairs of Iceland, but any binding agreements made by the Danish government on behalf of Icelandic interests had to be approved by the Alþingi, or Icelandic Parliament. In addressing the security of Iceland through defensive measures, Iceland and her people sought an idealistic path of perpetual neutrality with other states that may be in a state of war or rising conflict, thus the apparent need for a defense force to protect Iceland from invading states was not warranted. For a country with a population back then of less than 100,000, it was hoped that states and governments beyond Denmark would honor Icelandic neutrality. That proved to be wishful thinking just a mere 20 years later.
Nazi Germany seen Iceland as an important resupply/refueling post for its naval operations in the Atlantic as well as a staging post for patrolling transatlantic shipping lanes and attacking supply convoys that was keeping the Allied war effort alive. Additionally, another German initiative was to disrupt transatlantic sea lines of communication (SLOC) that primarily laid south of Iceland and the GIUK line. Thus, the allies - particularly the British early on - also noted the strategic value of Iceland. On May 10th, 1940, forces of the United Kingdom stepped ashore and “invaded” Iceland without a shot in order to prevent Nazi Germany from doing the same. From that point onward in history, Iceland’s strategic value was clearly noted, placing Iceland’s hope of perpetual neutrality as nothing more than idyllic thinking where the great powers, whether for good intentions or not, violated the sovereignty of states in a global chess game to counter their opponent’s moves and forwarded their own geopolitical interests.
When the Americans stepped foot in Iceland at the request of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the early summer of 1941, there was a garrison of 25,000 British “guests” stationed on the island; by the time U.S. forces arrived in Iceland that number swelled to nearly 45,000 – nearly 33% of the entire Icelandic population and with it came Iceland’s first foreign policy decision that was the defense agreement between the U.S. and Iceland. Yet, despite the protection offered by Allied forces to prevent the Nazi occupation of Iceland many Icelanders still felt violated due to a perception of losing their sovereignty and decision making in foreign affairs with other states. In a sense, Icelanders still clung onto the notion of neutrality even in times of global conflict. This belief structure has played an important role in Iceland’s foreign policy doctrine after WWII, their decision to join NATO, throughout the Cold War, and beyond.
As the war raged on, the Icelandic Parliament in 1944 voted to formally break times with Denmark who at the time was nearing its 4th year under Nazi control. The U.S. quickly recognized Icelandic independence as they now could develop deeper, formal diplomatic relations and work on security matters more freely throughout the war. At the same time, U.S. officials envisioned a post-war military and forward defense role for Iceland - the presence of a military base for naval vessels and aircraft that would patrol the center of the GIUK gap, as well as a permanent presence to man such capabilities. Yet the 1941 Defense Agreement acknowledged that once the war was over, the allied military presence would vacate, and Iceland would assume its neutral role in global affairs. Indeed, the American presence after the war was to some degree overstaying its welcome. But the populace and the Icelandic government, after the experience of WWII also understood that maintaining a neutral stance in foreign affairs was no longer 100% realistic. With the advent of longer-range aviation and naval capabilities, Iceland was geographically closer to both the United States and Western Europe than ever before while at the same time the great powers recognized the strategic position Iceland held for those who could ally with it…or overrun it.
Still, the Icelandic people wanted the best of both worlds – to maintain neutrality with all states while at the same time entering into a security alliance – all without having its own standing military. Initially Iceland turned down early offers to join a new transatlantic alliance in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) hoping for either the United Nations (UN) to provide for the collective security of smaller sovereign states or even a security pact between the Scandinavian countries of northern Europe. Both proved to not be feasible however as the now emergent power of the Soviet Union was (literally) testing the waters off Iceland’s shore when a Soviet fishing fleet first appeared off the waters in 1948. This was a particularly tense time in Icelandic foreign affairs; while seeking to be a neutral state but also inquiring what membership obligations in NATO would require, the Russians were shown to be lurking just offshore. Another concern of joining the alliance was based on nationalist ideas of sovereignty and the ability for Icelanders to make decisions independent of the alliance. After the debates were aired on the parliament’s floor, Iceland became a founding member of NATO in 1949 despite some opposition (and a small riot outside the parliament in Reykjavik). But the question of security still loomed. Iceland had no standing military to immediately secure its shores. The U.S., recognizing an opportunity, tendered an offer that would provide a minimal military presence while at the same time respect Icelandic sovereignty. The resulting bilateral Defense Force Agreement between Iceland and the United States [2] was signed on May 5, 1951. It was published two days later, the same day the US forces arrived in Iceland. The defense agreement was constructed within the framework of the NATO charter and provided for the defense of Iceland by U.S. military personnel but also a projection of that defense to include the “North Atlantic Treaty area” – which in Article 6(1) of the NATO treaty designates it as “territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer” [3]. Under the agreement, Iceland provided the land and facilities while the U.S. provided the personnel whose total number was “subject to the approval of the Icelandic Government.” It also provided diplomatic and sovereign balance between the two nations where Article V notes, “Nothing in this Agreement shall be so construed as to impair the ultimate authority of Iceland with regard to Icelandic affairs.” In effect the agreement was a win-win; the U.S. was able to secure Iceland as a strategic (if not a geographic) ally, and Iceland kept its sovereignty in its own foreign and domestic affairs while at the same time secure a means for its defense in a new post-war world that would eventually usher in a new geopolitical conflict – the Cold War. The agreement also allowed for both parties the option to unilaterally terminate the pact upon an agreed upon time limit of review and notification. This unilateral termination clause however did not abrogate the overarching NATO terms, noted specifically in Articles 5 & 6, whereas Iceland does not have a standing military to respond to the collective defense of the Alliance and its member states, it does have civilian personnel, resources, land, and infrastructure, which meets the obligations of the treaty. The primary infrastructure contribution by Iceland for NATO has been the Keflavik airport/air base on the Reykjanes Peninsula southwest of the capital Reykjavik. In the first years of the agreement the air base housed the Icelandic Defense Force (IDF) that stationed no more than 5,000 U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel and their families. The IDF also at times contained elements of the U.S. Army, Marines and Coast Guard. Despite the small numbers that comprised the IDF, their main function was the application of new technologies that tracked Soviet movements north of Iceland and along the GIUK gap. In 1966, the introduction of underwater sound surveillance systems (SOSUS) at the Keflavik Naval Facility (NAVFAC) was used to track Soviet submarines that probed into the North Atlantic seeking vulnerabilities along the Gap. In addition, an Airborne Radar System was installed on the land masses along the Gap (Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom) to complement SOSUS monitoring. Over time however, use of SOSUS had been phased out due to advancements in Soviet submarine capabilities that allowed its nuclear-powered submarines to fire long range ballistic missiles from the Barents Sea, Kola Peninsula, and areas of the Norwegian Sea [4].
The GIUK gap held an importance significance for both the U.S./NATO alliance and for the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nick Childs, a Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security for The International Institute for Strategic Studies likened the Gap as a “strategic gateway”. For NATO and the U.S., protecting the transatlantic SLOC at the time from the Soviets, just as it was in WWII when NAZI Germany was a threat, was critical for the alliance. But Childs points out that for the Soviets an anti-SLOC focus was never really the aim of Soviet naval strategy in the Gap region. It’s focus “was always on a more defensive posture to protect the homeland and the maritime flanks of Soviet army operations.” As the U.S. Navy changed its posture along the Gap from a forward projection strategy to a monitoring one, the Gap represented what Childs describes as a “Maginot-Line-like barrier defence line” with the U.S./NATO seeing the Gap as a line of containment (a new NATO Concept of Maritime Operations [CONMAROPS]) from Soviet vessels and aircraft from crossing the line; while for the Soviets, the Gap was seen as the outer perimeter from which it could navigate and operate without much encroachment and still have the potential ability to cause disruption and havoc to the alliance.
Still, Iceland proved to be valuable to projecting U.S. and NATO strategy in the region. For the Reagan administration in the 80s, Iceland’s technological monitoring and tracking capabilities became somewhat of a centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s forward maritime strategy. But throughout the Cold War, there continued to be those in Iceland who felt that a military presence was not in the best interests of the country. Two attempts to abrogate the 1951 defense agreement were made by left-wing political movements in Iceland’s Parliament in the late 50s and early 70s; however, with the ongoing Soviet threat to NATO states, the American presence remained.
When the Cold War ended there was a perception that the GIUK Gap no longer held any strategic or geopolitical importance. The Soviet Union was breaking up and the republic that is now Russia was just trying to find its place in Europe and Asia. When the terrorist attacks of 9/11 happened, the United States under the George W. Bush administration focused its sights on Afghanistan and Iraq on the war on terror and with it equipment, personnel, and money had to be diverted elsewhere. Keflavik’s fate, and the fate of the Icelandic Defense Force appears to have been forewarned in a memo [5] from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Secretary of Defense Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in 2003 concerning the costs to keep the Keflavik Air Base open. At the time the memo was delivered the invasion of Iraq led by the U.S. just commenced a little over 2 months earlier. Yearly costs to maintain the base were not prohibitively high, memo estimates showed a price tag of $225 million keep 2,464 Air Force, Navy, and civilian personnel as well as a small detachment of aircraft and detection capabilities. In the end, Bush administration officials felt that money, personnel, and equipment could be better spent and used elsewhere – specifically in the Middle East and Central Asia. By 2006, the U.S. made the unilateral decision to pull its remaining military personnel, close the Keflavik Air Station, and hand it over to the Icelandic government, thus ending a 35-year presence in Iceland. While some left-leaning parties in Iceland welcomed the move, many others could not help but feel a sense of abandonment. They felt they now had to look east, toward continental Europe to find security partners. But Iceland still was “protected” through its NATO membership and the 1951 security agreement with the U.S. – it just didn’t have a ready military presence. In addition, prior to the U.S. departure, a Joint Understanding [6] was agreed upon to continue in the spirit of the 1951 bilateral agreement. A year later, Vladimir Putin’s delivered an ominous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference with harsh words to the West concerning NATO encroachment in its own near abroad and the potential consequences that could entail Russian responses.
After that speech, Russia began to take advantage of the U.S.’s distraction that was Iraq and Afghanistan and began venturing into the Arctic waters [7] as well as NATO [8] and Icelandic airspace and its coastline [9]. Russian aggression in its former republics of Georgia and Ukraine between 2008 to 2022 further raised the alarm of NATO members of potential aggression against the alliance particularly toward the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries. To add to that, between 2015 and 2019 Russian naval policy [10] highlighted its ambitions for its Northern Fleet, which comprises approximately two-thirds of the Russian Navy, and its focus in the Arctic and areas in the North Atlantic to include the GIUK Gap. Russian naval activity, in the form of submarine operations [11] in northern waters only confirmed that the Russians were seeking to show their capabilities and, quite possibly, NATO vulnerabilities. NATO members were first-hand witnesses of their own capabilities and strategic knowledge of the Gap when they were invited to a tabletop exercise [12] hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in 2017. The conclusions and outcomes from the exercise was apparent; participants did not have the strategic - let alone geographical - knowledge of the Gap, but they also discovered that their military capabilities to respond to threats were woefully slow revealing the neglect the alliance placed on the Gap. The concerns of the absence and deficiencies of NATO and U.S. military and defense capabilities for Iceland have been documented since. Debates [13] in Iceland’s Alþingi since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have centered around whether “NATO troops should once again have a permanent presence in Iceland.” While scholars and experts believe that a high probability [14] exists that Russia would attack Iceland and the Keflavík station if a direct conflict between Russia and the Atlantic Alliance commences, or that the Arctic region will be one of the theatres of operation in future conflicts [15] between great powers, talk of a permanent military presence [16] in Iceland or even the formation of a true Icelandic military still has not to come to fruition other than the 2016 agreement [17] between the U.S. and Iceland, apart from small detachments of NATO members’ defense forces for patrolling activities. And still, like in the early days of consideration of Iceland joining NATO, there are those political parties in Iceland’s government who still believe Iceland’s foreign affairs [18] could be better served if not bound to NATO membership. Katrína Jakobsdóttir, the Prime Minister of Iceland from 2017 to April of this year, and former Chair of the Left-Green Movement political party, noted that despite her party’s opposition to NATO membership, she was bound by popular opinion and Iceland’s most recent national security policy, “which (still) stipulates Iceland's membership in NATO.”
Iceland’s electorate has now come to see the rising threat of Russia, the lack of a military defense presence in the country, and their island’s strategic value as a cause for concern moving forward. Evidence of this can be seen in two distinct polls conducted before [19] and after [20] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the perception of Russia as a growing threat rose noticeably among the respondents polled, the perceived level of security threats against Iceland was still at a low 22%, suggesting that Icelanders still feel geopolitically insulated from threats due to their geographic location, their perception of being a peaceful state with no military (despite their membership in the Atlantic Alliance), and quite possibly their confidence in the existing security agreements with the United States. The value of Iceland’s membership in NATO has become more valuable in relation to the rising Russian threat and growing Chinese influence globally. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is in the back of Icelanders’ minds if not front and center. Seeing a state (Ukraine) that is not part of a security alliance being invaded by a larger foe has made Iceland thankful for its membership in NATO. On the other hand, though, respondents in both surveys still see increased nationalism and populism (from Europe and the U.S.) as a threat to their sovereignty. While the majority sees the benefits and security of belonging to NATO, Iceland does not want to be told what to do by other states as it relates to their foreign policy decisions.
So how to overcome that? In 2022 the U.S. State Department issued its Integrated Country Strategy for Iceland [21] that reiterated the country’s importance to U.S. foreign policy especially as it relates to the Arctic. Part of its strategy to build stronger bilateral relations with Iceland is to “work toward the high priority objective that ‘[t]he Icelandic public maintains a favorable view of the United States and supports NATO membership’” and to “ensure Iceland retains and exercises its sovereignty.” Additionally, the strategy will seek to “expand and strengthen our commitment to a free and peaceful Europe by countering aggression and malign influence by state and non-state actors and modernizing the NATO alliance to meet emerging threats.” This second part of the strategy has been noted also under the White House’s 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance [22] which called for the United States to “lean forward…(and) reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world…we will reaffirm, invest in, and modernize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” (these calls for action also are mentioned in the 2022 National Security Strategy [23] in similar contexts). Achieving such mission goals spelled out in the Iceland strategy would achieve its most important mission goal of ensuring “that the United States is seen by Icelanders as Iceland’s most trusted ally and strategic partner” but only if it can change the minds of “influential voices (who) question the benefits of Iceland’s continued membership in NATO.”
Achieving these objectives is possible. In Iceland’s parliament, there are U.S. and NATO allies who continue to welcome and hope for the reemergence of a U.S. military presence in Iceland. Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, the Chairperson of the Viðreisn (Liberal Reform Party) noted in 2022 [24] the need to consider talks about a “permanent presence of military forces in Iceland.” Her party is a supporter of NATO membership and notes the value of such a membership for Iceland.
With the departure of former Prime Minister Katrína Jakobsdóttir in April of 2024 whose Left-Green Party historically opposed NATO membership, the window of opportunity has further opened with the appointment of Bjarni Benediktsson who has assumed the role and whose party, the Independence Party has also been historically a strong supporter of Iceland’s membership in NATO.
While the 2016 Security Cooperation Agreement [25] between the U.S. and Iceland reconstituted a new U.S. security presence in Iceland, the presence has been minimal at best. The planned allocation of U.S. funds in FY 2018 and 2020 [26] to improve the Naval Air Station at Keflavik was far less than what was spent in all of 2003 (considering the far greater number of military personnel at the base). Today, Iceland is home to an Air Defense and Surveillance System (IADS) that assists in the overall NATO integrated Air Defense System [27] while NATO forces operate long-range maritime patrol aircraft that patrols Iceland’s waters as well as NATO waters in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Thus, there is a military presence in Iceland, but it is only enough to operate the stationed aircraft [28] and surveillance systems. There is also a rotating mission among NATO members to patrol the airspace around Iceland. In Icelandic waters, U.S. submarines [29] stop to resupply and exchange crew members. Quite possibly in response to the dismal results to the Forgotten Waters tabletop exercise mentioned earlier in this piece, there also has been onsite training exercises [30] from a ten nation Joint Expeditionary Force to familiarize the participants of the challenges of monitoring, patrolling, and identifying and solving security threats in Iceland’s section along the GIUK Gap. There are also continuing plans to build additional infrastructure in and around the Keflavik base [31] funded by NATO to improve capabilities for alliance forces to carry out their existing missions as well as addressing issues in future security crises. While the existing and future infrastructure will further enhance NATO initiatives, it cannot by itself ward off an invading or occupying force that would quickly establish its presence without a fight. Icelandic state media posed the question [32] in early 2023 in these terms to Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on whether the United States will be able to protect Iceland and NATO assets in the country from an unexpected attack. The Ministry’s response was vague, citing, “the measures that are currently in place…ensure, in the opinion of the Icelandic government, the defense of the country and the people…(I)f the threat assessment changes, changes are made to the response and team strength is transferred according to needs.” This seems more like a reactive than a proactive approach to Iceland’s security from its NATO partners. Iceland’s current president, Guðni Th. Jóhannesson, however, has noticed the urgency of the current geopolitical moment and stressed to a visiting NATO Parliamentary Delegation [33] in Reykjavik in May of 2023 that “the security of this island depends on the security of others.” Yet, this thinking along with Icelanders’ notion of sovereignty in their external affairs as well as their long-held beliefs of peaceful neutrality and their decision to not possess an active military of their own places the people and their ideals on contradictory terrain. Iceland cannot have both…or can they? In addition, can the United States once again rely on Iceland to further U.S. and NATO security in the North Atlantic which will reciprocate Iceland’s own security that it seeks?
These aims are achievable, but again, it will entail a diplomacy from the U.S. that should not be perceived as patronizing or paternalistic towards Iceland’s government or its people. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly on a human scale, we must convince our NATO ally that despite the renewed presence of military troops in Iceland, that the United States is not an occupying force but a force that will work in conjunction with the Icelandic government and respects the nation’s sovereignty of its borders and in its foreign policy and geopolitical decisions. If Icelanders consider themselves neutral until the conditions in global affairs compels a change to do so, then the U.S. must not apply thumbscrews on Iceland to make them vote or decide a particular way or another lest contempt and animus forms on the decision to welcome a semi-permanent defense force to protect not only NATO and U.S. interests but more importantly for Icelanders in their own interests and their sovereignty to make decisions on the world stage as to their customs, values, and history. To have an oppressive state like Russia to make those decisions for Iceland would be a terrible counterfactual, but an ominous reality if we do not take advantage of the situation now.
Effectively protecting Iceland and the GIUK Gap is also achievable in U.S. terms of affordability and manpower if both are considered a major factor in garrisoning an active force in the country. Focusing on these two, we should look back to Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. military presence in both countries. Accounting for peak presence, there were more than 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2011 and over 160,000 personnel in Iraq in 2007 [34]. Today, only 2,500 troops remain in Iraq for advising and training purposes and none (as we know of) are in Afghanistan after the 2021 withdrawal of forces. As of March 31, 2024 [35] there are more active duty and APF DoD (Appropriated Fund Civilian Personnel) members of the U.S. military in the Bahamas (63), and Trinidad and Tobago (10) than there was in Iceland (4).
Concerning funding, between 2001 and 2019 the conflict in Afghanistan cost the U.S. $975 billion [36]. In 2003 when Donald Rumsfeld noted Iceland’s cost was too high, the U.S. spent $17 billion in Afghanistan for 13,100 troops. The estimated appropriations for military operations and other defense activities in Iraq [37] for 2003 totaled $46 billion. While obviously the missions were vastly more important in those two countries than in Iceland at the time (the perceived threat was minimal), when the U.S. disestablished the Icelandic Defense Force in 2006, it was costing the U.S. about 0.05% [38] of the total U.S. defense budget for that year. Today, the U.S. is channeling billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine [39] and Israel [40] since the start of those countries’ conflicts against Russia and Hamas, respectively. Again, the money is well spent to repel Russian aggression and to counter and eliminate Hamas (as well as provide additional humanitarian aid to non-combatant Palestinian Gazans). But this time there are no U.S. troops on the ground in those conflict zones. Ukraine is not a NATO ally nor a Major Non-NATO Ally [41] (MNNA) (Israel is, however). Iceland is an integral part of NATO, even without a standing military, and if true to the letter of the claim if not the spirit of the statement made by Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the threat assessment has changed, now the response and team strength needs to concurrently change as well.
There is justifiable evidence and support to once again open up and reconstitute the Keflavik base and maintain a security presence in Iceland and to project to Russia that the U.S. and NATO are aligning their pieces in a defensive posture to counter potential further aggression. The number of personnel does not need to equal that of peak numbers found in Iraq or Afghanistan, or even current numbers stationed in Japan, South Korea, the emirate states on the Arabian Peninsula or NATO allies on the European continent. But there should be a presence large enough that both counters any sizeable threat that presents itself to the country (Russian bombers came within 26 miles of Iceland’s coast in 2015), as well as to effectively conduct patrol operations in the North Atlantic Treaty Area designated by NATO in that part of the GIUK Gap that Iceland stands on. Ideally, two battalions specialized to conduct Arctic-type operations that have an understanding of Iceland’s terrain and locales of strength and vulnerabilities would be able to perform such a mission that could repel and buy time for those surprise attack concerns raised by the Icelandic media and press towards Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consisting of about 1,000 soldiers per battalion, the presence of 2,000 well-trained troops is less than the totals that were stationed in Iceland during the Cold War but enough to fulfill the task of defense and hold out for reinforcements that may take NATO at least 1-2 days if one considers Germany’s recent efforts [42] to conduct such an exercise under similar circumstances and is any indication of readiness. This number can be complimented with specialized air support in the form of one Air Force Squadron consisting of 18-24 aircraft and about 600 personnel that can be rotated on a regular basis along with the two army battalions. If that number of manned aircraft is simply too much to commit to defending Iceland and the GIUK Gap, a smaller flight group consisting of two to six aircraft can be deployed on a rotating basis. Replacing the larger manned squadrons also can be achieved with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) through a squadron similar to the U.S. Air Force’s 11th Atack Squadron. Its primary mission would be surveillance in the waters around Iceland - in the Greenland and Norwegian Seas, the North Atlantic Ocean and the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland. While there are pros and cons [43] to the military application of UAVs versus manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, application of UAVs has resulted in lower acquisition costs and recurring costs per flying hour for the U.S. military. In the spirit of unmanned craft, technological advancements in unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) can further the mission in Iceland with minimal staffing but with increased surveillance. While this technology has not been fully vetted, and issues for Congress remain [44] the U.S. military has heavily invested [45] time, research, and money in improving UUVs and USVs for a larger role in surveillance and attack capabilities. The U.S. military appears fully committed [46] to employing and integrating these unmanned craft in its everyday applications and mission objectives now and into the future. Such capabilities would prove valuable across all facets of defense in Iceland. Lastly, and most futuristically, the application of artificial intelligence (AI) [47] cannot be ignored. Applying AI for use in predictive analytics to forecast potential threats, and identifiable patterns and trends perceived to be threats have already been employed. Use of all three technologies in the future can reduce a “heavy” military presence that often has concerned some Icelanders of a perception of an “invading” force akin to what their parents and grandparents seen during WWII and the Cold War.
The Icelandic government notes critically that NATO and the Bilateral Defence Agreement of 1951 between Iceland the U.S. remain fundamental pillars to Iceland’s security and defense. Carl Schuster, a professor at Hawaii Pacific University and a retired U.S. Navy captain, sagaciously observed [48] about Iceland, “Whoever possessed the island could base air and naval forces to dominate the sea and the skies of the western and central Atlantic.” A U.S. presence in Iceland can serve to fulfill both statements in countering potential future Russian aggression in areas Russia thinks it can exploit, project U.S. security beyond its own shores but most importantly preserve sovereignty for future generations of Icelanders - a valuable and strategic ally in NATO - even without a standing military. It is a win-win-win that should be taken advantage of by the United States, Iceland, and NATO.
References
[1] Bjorgulfsdottir, M. (1989, Winter). The Paradox of a Neutral Ally: A Historical Overview of Iceland’s Participation in NATO. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 13;1, 71-94. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289776
[2] The Avalon Project (2008). Defense of Iceland: Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951. Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ice001.asp#art5
[3] Noth Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf
[4] [10] Childs, N. (2022, April). Gauging the Gap: The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap – A Strategic Assessment. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2022/05/gauging-the-gap_the-greenlandicelandunited-kingdom-gap_a-strategic-assessment.pdf
[5] Rumsfeld, D. (2003, May 29). Cost of Iceland (Memo to Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. https://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/234/2003-05-29%20to%20Powell%20and%20Rice%20re%20Cost%20of%20Iceland.pdf
[6] Government of Iceland. (2006). Joint Understanding The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Iceland. https://www.government.is/library/01-Ministries/Ministry-for-Foreign-Affairs/Joint_Understanding.pdf
[7] [11] Steinn Guðmundsson, A. (2019, October 30). Russia’s largest submarine operation since the Cold War. Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/erlent/2019/10/30/staersta_adgerd_fra_kalda_stridinu/
[8] Russian bombers within NATO airspace. (2019, March 19). Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2019/03/18/russar_innan_loftrymissvaedisins/
[9] [38] [48] Kochis, D. and Slattery, B. (2016, June 21). Iceland: Outsized Importance for Transatlantic Security. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/iceland-outsized-importance-transatlantic-security
[12] Smith, J. and Hendrix, J. (2017, May 1). FORGOTTEN WATERS Minding the GIUK Gap: A Tabletop Exercise. Center for a New American Security. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06178?seq=3
[13] Should Permanent Presence of NATO Troops Be Considered in Iceland? (2022, March 7). Iceland Monitor https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/politics_and_society/2022/03/07/should_permanent_presence_of_nato_troops_be_conside/
[14] Keflavík Airport likely to be attacked in war. (2024, February 22). Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2024/02/22/liklegt_ad_radist_yrdi_a_keflavikurstod_i_stridi/
[15] Einarsson, T. (2023, June 7). The Arctic not exempt from Conflict. Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2023/06/07/nordurslodir_ekki_undanskildar_i_atokum/
[16] An Icelandic army is not on the agenda. (2023, March 7). Iceland Monitor. https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2023/03/07/an_icelandic_army_is_not_on_the_agenda/
[17] [25] United States Department of State. (2017, October 17). Agreement Between the United States of America and Iceland. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/17-1017-Iceland-Defense-Coop-Notes.pdf
[18] The Prime Minister has not changed his mind. (2022, May 23). Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2022/05/23/forsaetisradherra_hefur_ekki_skipt_um_skodun/
[19] Ómarsdottir, S.B. (2021). Pragmatic and Wary of Change Icelanders Views on International Cooperation. Institute of International Affairs University of Iceland. https://www.kas.de/documents/272774/272823/Pragmatic+and+wary+of+Change.+Icelanders+Views+on+International+Cooperation.pdf/2519c782-35ce-e913-7710-4fea5729571c?version=1.0&t=1616523637117
[20] Ómarsdottir, S.B. (2023, March 21 to April 16). Leaning into Cooperation Changes in Icelanders’ Perspectives on International Politics after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. Institute of International Affairs University of Iceland. https://ams.overcastcdn.com/documents/Leaning_into_Cooperation_Final.pdf
[21] United States Department of State. (2022, March 22). Integrated Country Strategy Iceland. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ICS_EUR_Iceland_Public.pdf
[22] United States National Archives. (2021, March). Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
[23] United States National Archives. (2022, October). National Security Strategy. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
[24] Johannessen, K.H. (2022, November 19). The permanent presence of troops needs to be discussed. Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2022/11/19/raeda_tharf_fasta_vidveru_hersveita/
[26] United States Department of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2019, March). Construction Programs (C-1) Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2020. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_c1.pdf
[27] Government of Iceland. (n.d.). National Security. https://www.government.is/topics/foreign-affairs/national-security/
[28] Edvardsen, A. (2023, September 6). Increased Allied Military Presence in Iceland. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/increased-allied-military-presence-iceland
[29] US Navy submarine at Helguvík. (2023, July 20). Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2023/07/20/kafbatur_bandariska_hersins_vid_helguvik/
[30] Gunnarsson, H.N. (2023, June 8). Military Command Center in Iceland. Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2023/06/08/herstjornarmidstod_a_islandi/
[31] NATO fully funds construction in Helguvík. (2023, June 15). Iceland Monitor. https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2023/06/15/nato_fully_funds_construction_in_helguvik/
[32] Johannessen, K.H. (2023, March 11). Preparedness concerns national security. Morgunblaðið. https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2023/03/11/vidbunadur_vardar_thjodaroryggi/
[33] North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Parliamentary Assembly. (2023, May 5). Iceland’s Comprehensive Approach to Security is Complemented by a National Focus on Harnessing Natural Resources and Innovation. https://www.nato-pa.int/news/icelands-comprehensive-approach-security-complemented-national-focus-harnessing-natural
[34] US Troops in the Middle East: What are They Doing and Where? (2024, February 3). Voice of America (from Reuters article). https://www.voanews.com/a/us-troops-in-middle-east-what-are-they-doing-and-where-/7469452.html
[35] United States Department of Defense Defense Manpower Data Center. (n.d.) DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports and Publications. https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports
[36] McCarthy, N. (2019, September 12). The Annual Cost Of The War In Afghanistan Since 2001 [Infographic]. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/09/12/the-annual-cost-of-the-war-in-afghanistan-since-2001-infographic/?sh=6e8d71041971
[37] Orszag, P. (2007, October 24). Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other Activities Related to the War on Terrorism (before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives). Congressional Budget Office. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8690/10-24-costofwar_testimony.pdf
[39] Masters, J. and Merrow, W. (2025, March 11 [updated]). Here’s How Much Aid the United States Has Sent Ukraine. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine
[40] Surman, M., Levenson, M, et al. (2024, April 24). After $15 Billion in Military Aid , Israel Calls Alliance With U.S. ‘Ironclad’. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/world/middleeast/israel-us-aid.html
[41] United States Department of State. (2025, January 20 [updated]). Major Non-NATO Ally States. https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/
[42] Machi, V. (2023, July 28). German Air Force rushes to Iceland in ‘Rapid Viking’ drill. DefenseNews. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/07/28/german-air-force-rushes-to-iceland-in-rapid-viking-drill/
[43] Congressional Budget Office. (2021, June). Usage Patterns and Costs of Unmanned Aerial Systems. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57260#_idTextAnchor006
[44] O’Rourke, R. (2024, December 19). Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf
[45] Hemler, J. (2024, January 18). UUVs: Three Areas to Watch in 2024. Defense and Security Monitor. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2024/01/18/uuvs-three-areas-to-watch-in-2024/
[46] Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030. (2005, August 4). United States Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://irp.fas.org/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf
[47] Cohen, C. (2023, July 25). AI in Defense: Navigating Concerns, Seizing Opportunities. National Defense. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/25/defense-department-needs-a-data-centric-digital-security-organization
Additional Reading/Visual Resources
Map of Iceland’s location along the GIUK Gap, from The Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation research). Found at https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/~/media/infographics/2016/06/bg3121/bg-iceland-map-1-1200.jpg
Iceland's Security Identity Dilemma: The End of a U.S. Military Presence, an article by Valur Ingimundarson found in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2007). https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289379
Iceland in the Arctic, a policy brief by Ryan Dean dated June 6, 2023 for the North American and Arctic Defense Security Network. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/23-June-Iceland-Policy-Brief.pdf
The Paradox of a Neutral Ally: A Historical Overview of Iceland's Participation in NATO, an article by Margret Bjorgulfsdottir found in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1989). file:///C:/Users/19107/Downloads/UP149.001.00025.00010.archival.pdf
Changing Strategic Geography in the GIUK Gap, a chapter written by Rebecca Pincus, found in the volume On Thin Ice? Perspectives on Arctic Security, edited by Duncan Depledge and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 2021 file:///C:/Users/19107/Downloads/Depledge-Lackenbauer-On-Thin-Ice-final-upload.pdf
Iceland and Arctic Security: US Dependency and the Search for an Arctic Identity, a chapter written by Pia Elísabeth Hansson and Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, found in the volume On Thin Ice? Perspectives on Arctic Security edited by Duncan Depledge and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 2021 file:///C:/Users/19107/Downloads/Depledge-Lackenbauer-On-Thin-Ice-final-upload.pdf